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Frameworks for cooperative multiagent decision making may be divided into those where
each agent is assigned a single variable (SVFs) and those where each agent carries an inter-
nal model, which can be further divided into loosely coupled frameworks (LCFs) and tightly
coupled frameworks (TCFs). In TCFs, agent communication interfaces render their subuni-
verses conditionally independent. In LCFs, either agents do not communicate or their mes-
sages are semantically less restricted. SVFs do not address the privacy issue well. LCF
agents cannot draw from collective knowledge as well as TCF agents can. However, dispro-
portional effort has been dedicated to SVFs and LCFs, which can be attributed partially to
unawareness of the computational advantages of TCFs over performance, efﬁciency and
privacy. This work aims to provide empirical evidence of such advantages by comparing
recursive modeling method from LCFs and collaborative design network from TCFs, both of
which are decision-theoretic and the latter of which is based on graphical models. We
apply both to a testbed, multiagent expedition, resolve technical issues encountered, and
report our experimental evaluation.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
We consider frameworks for online decision making (rather than ofﬂine policy making, e.g., [1]) in cooperative multiagent
systems. They may be divided into SVFs where each agent is assigned a single variable in the universe and those where each
agent carries an internal model over a subuniverse. Frameworks using internal models can be further divided into LCFs and
TCFs. In TCFs, agents communicate throughmessages over agent interfaces that are semantically rigorously deﬁned to render
their subuniverses conditionally independent. In LCFs, either agents do not communicate but rely on observing other agents’
actions to coordinate, or their messages are semantically less restricted.
SVFs do not address the issue of private versus public variables well, as they do not have infrastructure to differentiate
variables as such (we discuss the cryptographical SVFs in Section 6). LCFs are often motivated by tasks where agents can-
not communicate. Given the proliferation of distributed and wireless computing, it is hard to ﬁnd task environments
where cooperative agents cannot communicate (except a few of military nature). Due to tightly controlled agent interface,
joint belief of team agents is well deﬁned and a TCF agent’s belief is consistent with the joint belief. This is generally not
true in LCFs even when agents do communicate (see Proposition 4.5 and Theorem 8.10 in [2] for a formal treatment). In
other words, a TCF agent draws from collective knowledge better than a LCF agent can in general. However, signiﬁcant
research efforts have been dedicated to SVFs, e.g., [3–6], and LCFs, e.g., [7–10], in comparison with those to TCFs
[2,11,12]. This can be attributed at least partly to unawareness of the computational advantages of TCFs over performance,. All rights reserved.
ng), fhanshar@uoguelph.ca (F. Hanshar).
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work, we select one representative, recursive modeling method (RMM) [7], from LCFs and one, collaborative design network
(CDN) [11], from TCFs, both of which are decision-theoretic and the latter of which is based on graphical models. We apply
both to a testbed multiagent decision problem, multiagent expedition (MAE), resolve technical issues encountered, and
compare them experimentally.
Contribution of this work includes identiﬁcation and analysis of modeling issues in applying CDN and RMM to MAE, and
representational and computational solutions developed. More importantly, the experimental result demonstrates superior
performance of CDN over RMM, and the empirical result is generalized through a comparative analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews background on MAE, CDN and RMM. Section 3 pre-
sents modeling and representation of MAE with CDN. Technical issues on applying RMM to MAE are presented in Section 4.
Section 5 reports experimental results. A general comparative analysis of TCFs, LCFs and SVFs is given in Section 6.
2. Background
2.1. Collaborative design networks
CDNs are motivated by collaborative industrial design in supply chains. Consider ﬁrst the centralized design, where the
agent responsible for designing a product encodes design knowledge and preference into a design network (DN) S ¼ ðV ;G; PÞ.
Its universe is a set of discrete variables V ¼ D [ T [M [ U. D is a set of design parameters. T is a set of environmental factors of
the product under design.M is a set of objective performance measures and U is a set of subjective utility functions of the agent.
Each variable has a ﬁnite domain of possible values.
The dependence structure G ¼ ðV ; EÞ is a directed acyclic graph whose nodes are mapped to elements of V and whose set E
of arcs encode design constraints, dependency of performance on design and environment, and dependency of utility on
performance.
P is a set of potentials, one for each node x, formulated as a conditional probability distribution PðxjpðxÞÞ, where pðxÞ are
parent nodes of x. PðdjpðdÞÞ, where d 2 D, encodes a design constraint. PðtjpðtÞÞ and PðmjpðmÞÞ, where t 2 T and m 2 M, rep-
resent typical probability distributions. Each utility variable u 2 U has a domain fy;ng. Pðu ¼ yjpðuÞÞ is a utility function
f ðpðuÞÞ 2 ½0;1. Each node u is assigned a weight k 2 ½0;1 such that Pu2Uk ¼ 1.1 With P thus deﬁned,1 ToY
x2VnU
PðxjpðxÞÞis a joint probability distribution (JPD) over D [ T [M. With the assumption of additive independence among utility variables
[13], the expected utility of a design d isEUðdÞ ¼
X
i
ki
X
m
fiðmÞPðmjdÞ
 !
;where d is a conﬁguration of D; i indexes utility node ui 2 U, m is a conﬁguration of parents of ui, and ki is the weight of ui.
For collaborative design in a supply chain, each supplier is regarded as the designer of its supplied component and this
design role is delegated to an agent. All design agents, one per supplier, form a collaborative design system. The universe V of
the product design is divided (with overlapping) among agents into a set fVig of subuniverses, where each Vi is about the
design of a component and [iV i ¼ V . Each agent embodies a design network called a design subnet Si ¼ ðVi; Gi; PiÞ over a
subuniverse.
The agents are organized into a hypertree: Each hypernode corresponds to an agent, its subuniverse and its subnet. Each
hyperlink (called agent interface) corresponds to the design parameters shared by the two subnets, which renders them con-
ditionally independent. These design parameters are public variables. The remaining variables in each subnet are private. The
hypertree speciﬁes to whom an agent can communicate directly. Each subnet is assigned a weight wi, representing the com-
promise of agents over their individual preferences, where
P
iwi ¼ 1. The collection of subnets fSi ¼ ðVi; Gi; PiÞg forms a CDN.
The productY
x2Vn[iUi
PðxjpðxÞÞis a JPD over [iðDi [ Ti [MiÞ, where PðxjpðxÞÞ is associated with node x in a subnet. The expected utility of a design d isEUðdÞ ¼
X
i
wi
X
j
kij
X
m
fijðmÞPðmjdÞ
 ! !
;where d is a conﬁguration of [iDi; i indexes subnets, j indexes utility nodes fuijg in ith subnet, m is a conﬁguration of parents
of uij, and kij is the weight associated with uij. Hence, given a CDN, a decision-theoretic optimal design is well deﬁned.simplify this and following notations, we have chosen not to write as
P
u2Uku ¼ 1.
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sages over agent interfaces along the hypertree. First, local (partial) designs are evaluated at individual agents. Then, two
rounds of message passing are performed, initiated by an arbitrary agent A on the hypertree. In the ﬁrst round, messages
ﬂow along the hypertree towards A. For each message-sending agent B, the maximum expected utility of each partial design
over its interface with the receiving agent C, based on the sub-hypertree rooted at B is communicated. In the second round,
messages ﬂow along the hypertree away from A. For each message-sending agent C, the optimal partial design over its inter-
face with the receiving agent B is communicated. After communication, all agents have local designs that are globally opti-
mal (collectively maximizing EUðdÞ). Inference computation (including communication) is linear on the number of agents
[11] and is efﬁcient for a non-trivial class of CDNs [14].
Although CDNs are motivated by collaborative industrial design, their key components are sufﬁciently general as a deci-
sion-theoretic framework for cooperative, distributed decision making. For readers who are familiar with multiply sectioned
Bayesian networks (MSBNs) [2], CDNs can be viewed as extensions of MSBNs similarly to the way in which inﬂuence dia-
grams [15] extend Bayesian networks [16]. In this work, we apply CDNs as collaborative decision networks and as a repre-
sentative of TCFs.
For readers who are familiar with MAIDs [17], we brieﬂy comment on their difference. An MAID is a centralized represen-
tation of a game and can be used to ﬁnd a Nash equilibrium by centralized computation. A CDN is a distributed representation
of cooperative agents and can be used by agents to compute distributively the optimal individual actions that are globally
optimal. Hence, CDNs are fundamentally different from MAIDs [17].2.2. Recursive modeling method
RMM was proposed as a general decision-theoretic framework for decision making in a multiagent system, where agents
are not necessarily cooperative. We review the main ideas of RMM as presented in [7]. An agent’s preference over conse-
quences of joint actions of all agents is encoded using a payoff matrix. In a system of n agents, a payoff matrix used by
an agent A has n dimensions, with one dimension for each agent. The width of each dimension is equal to the number of
alternative actions of the corresponding agent. Each cell of the matrix corresponds to the outcome of a joint action by all
agents and is ﬁlled with the utility of the joint action based on the preference of A.
Agents do not communicate. To coordinate actions, each agent reasons about other agents through a hierarchy of recur-
sive models. As shown in Fig. 1, in a systemwith agents A and B, the top level model in A is its own payoff matrix. Each model
in the second level represents what A believes to be the payoff matrix of B, assuming a speciﬁc state SB of B. Agent A main-
tains possible states of B as a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases. Hence, the second level includes one model for
each state SB of B, and associates it with a probability PðSBÞ. The third level represents what A believes to be B’s models of A.
Each model at this level has a parent model of B (for a particular state SB of B). The model assumes a speciﬁc state SA of A and
is associated with A’s probability for the event that B believes the state of A to be SA, given B is in state SB. As the recursive
process proceeds, detailed modeling knowledge about the other agent will no longer be available at some level. The hierar-
chy terminates with no-info models, which assume equal probability of states.
Through dynamic programming using the hierarchy, the action of agent A with the maximum expected utility can be
computed. Furthermore, as A interacts with other agents and observes their actions, the probabilities associated with the
hierarchy can be updated through Bayesian learning [7].P(S   )B
P(B believes S    | S   )A B
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
A’s payoff
model
B’s payoff model
assumed by  A
B’s model of A
assumed by  A
No−info
model
Fig. 1. Illustration of RMM hierarchy by agent A in a two agent system.
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tive of LCFs.
2.3. Multiagent expedition
In order to compare the performance of CDNs and RMM, we needed a common testbed that is sufﬁciently complex to
involve major issues of multiagent decision making, and is reasonably controllable within a laboratory setting. We term this
testbed multiagent expedition and detail it below.
An open area is abstracted as a grid of cells, where agents can move around. At any cell and at each time step, an agent has
ﬁve possible movement actions: moving to an adjacent cell along one of four directions (referred to as north, south, east,west)
or remaining in the current cell (referred to as halt). The effect of an action is uncertain as shown in Fig. 2. That is, the action
north may cause the agent to land on each of four unintended cells.
We assume that a cell is either empty or is occupied by an object. The object may be interesting or harmful to agents. We
associate each cell with a numerical reward to quantify the desirability of the object located at the cell. A cell that is empty or
contains an object which is neither interesting nor harmful has a reward of a base value, say, 0.1 in a scale of [0,1]. The reward
at a harmful cell is lower than the base value. The reward at an interesting cell is higher than the base value and can be fur-
ther increased through agent cooperation as elaborated below.
When a physical object at a given location is to be manipulated (e.g., digging, lifting, pushing, etc.), cooperation is often
most effective when a certain number of agents are involved. We refer to this number as the most effective level of cooper-
ation. The per-agent productivity is reduced when less or more agents are involved. We set the most effective level at 2,
although this is not required. For instance, the reward that can be collected by a single agent from a particular interesting
cell may be 0.3. We refer to it as a unilateral reward. If three agents each moves to a distinct cell of reward 0.3, the team col-
lects a total reward of 0.9. However, if two agents cooperate at the cell, each receives 0.42. We refer to the reward collected
by the agent pair, 0.84, as a bilateral reward. That is, if two agents both move to the cell, and a third agent move to another
cell of unilateral reward 0.3, the team collects a total reward of 1.14. On the other hand, if all three agents meet at the cell, the
team collects only 0.84, the same amount of reward as if two of them cooperate at the cell and the third moves to a cell of
value 0.
This property of agent environment promotes effective cooperations and discourages unproductive ones. It is encoded by
associating each cell with a reward pair ðu; bÞ, where u is the unilateral reward and b is the bilateral reward. For example, the
above mentioned cell has the reward pair (0.3,0.84).
After an interesting cell has been visited by any agent, its reward is decreased to the base value. As a result of this prop-
erty, wandering within a neighborhood is unproductive and agents must move around strategically.
Agents have no prior knowledge on how rewards are distributed in the area. Instead, at any cell, an agent can perceive the
cell’s absolute location (e.g., through GPS on Earth or triangulation with two base stations on Mars). It can also perceive the
reward distribution in its own neighborhood. A 13-cell neighborhood is shown in Fig. 3.
An agent can perceive the location of another agent if the latter is within a small radius. It can communicate with agents
within this radius as well.
The objective of a team of agents is to move around the area, cooperate as needed, and maximize the team reward over a
ﬁnite horizon. They must do so based on local observations and limited inter-agent communication.
Multiagent expedition can be characterized as a decentralized partially observable Markov decision process (DEC-POM-
DP) [18]. The state of the environment is described by locations of all agents as well as the distribution of rewards. It is sto-
chastic since the effect of actions are uncertain. It is Markovian as the new state is conditionally independent of the history
given the current state and the joint action of agents. It is partially observable because each agent can only perceive its neigh-
borhood, but not reward distribution of the area and other agents beyond the neighborhood. As an agent can perceive its
own location and nearby agents, a signiﬁcant amount of relevant information in the environmental state is obtained through
observation. On the other hand, not all relevant information has been obtained, because knowing the reward distribution
beyond the neighborhood will allow the agent to plan better.
To capture this difference from the case where agents cannot perceive their own location reliably, we refer to the stochas-
tic process as a decentralized weakly partially observable Markov decision process (DEC-W-POMDP).Fig. 2. Uncertain effects of an intended movement action (denoted by arrow).
Fig. 3. Observable neighborhood (shaded) of an agent.
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The general problem of MAE is exponentially complex on the number of agents n and the length of horizon k. Given cur-
rent agent positions, each agent has ﬁve possible actions. Hence, there are 5n joint actions and 5nk joint plans of horizon k.
Since each action has ﬁve possible effects, a joint action has 5n possible effects, a joint plan has 5nk possible effects, and the
5nk joint plans have a total of 52nk possible effects. Each autonomous agent needs to evaluate these effects, identify the opti-
mal joint plan, and obtain its own optimal action sequence. For six agents and horizon 2, each agent needs to evaluate
524  6 1016 possible effects. Below, we present modeling of the MAE problem as a CDN to carry out the computation more
efﬁciently.
3.1. Splitting agent team into groups
We divide a team of n agents into smaller groups to allow a high degree of inner-group cooperation and a low degree of
inter-group interaction. Grouping has no negative effect on scaling up. It allows group members to stay close so that they can
cooperate effectively, as long as the group size is no smaller than the most effective level of cooperation. It allows different
groups to stay away from each other, which not only enables the team to explore the area more effectively, but also allows
reduction of computation by reducing inter-group interaction. In this work, we set the most effective level of cooperation at
2 and the group size at 3 (see Section 3.2 for inner-group organization), although these are not required. We consider inner-
group interaction in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, and inter-group interaction in Section 3.4.
3.2. Graphical modeling
Denote the three agents in a group by A;B and C. To speed up computation while allowing the most effective level of coop-
eration, we restrict inner-group agent interaction to pairwise. We only allow direct cooperation between A and B and be-
tween B and C. This imposes a hypertree organizational structure A B C for the group. The CDN subnets for agents A
and B are shown in Fig. 4, where the horizon is 2. The subnet for C is similar to that of A.
As mentioned earlier, we apply CDN as a collaborative decision network. Movement decisions correspond to design nodes
(squares). Agent positions correspond to performance nodes (ovals). Rewards are represented through utility nodes (dia-
monds). In the subnet, each variable mvx;i represents agent x’s movement decision for time step i and has the domainfnorth; south; east;west; haltg:Fig. 4. Multiagent expedition CDN subnets for agent A (left) and B (right).
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x;1
y has a size 5 at most
and the domain of psx;2y has a size 13 at most. The conditional probability distribution P ps
x;i
y jmvx;i
 
associated with psx;iy spec-
iﬁes the uncertain effect of a movement decision. Table 1 illustrates P psx;1y jmvx;1
 
, where the current position of agent x is
cell (0,0).
Each variable rwxy;iy or rw
yx;i
y represents the reward collected by agent y at time step i, due to cooperation (or lack of it) with
agent x. Note that rewards collected at different time-steps are additive and hence are decomposed. Due to restriction of
pairwise agent interaction, the reward collected by agent B at a given time step is also decomposed into one for each inter-
action. An agent receives the unilateral reward if it moves to a cell alone. It receives half of the bilateral reward if it meets
another group member at a cell.
3.3. Guiding agents with group direction
To reduce the domains of agent movement decisions and their multiplicative effect on planning computation, we require
that agents’ movements be guided by a group direction. If the current group direction is north, then A and C do not attempt
moving south. This reduces the domains ofmvA;i andmvC;i by one value. Note that even though A and C do not attempt mov-
ing south, they may still move to south due to the uncertain effect of movement.
Movement variables mvx;i are public variables and must have the same domains at each group member’s subnet. Hence,
at any time, group members must agree on what is the current group direction. This is achieved by two measures: First,
group members are required to stay within a small radius to each other. The consequence is that group members may per-
ceive each other’s position. Second, a common algorithm is used by group members to compute the group direction based on
their positions.
The group direction is the cardinal direction closest to the vector obtained by rotating, 90 counterclockwise, the vector
pointing from agent A to C. In case of ties between a pair of directions differing by 90, a predeﬁned default out of the two is
used. In Fig. 5, the vector from A to C is shown as a dashed arrow, and the group direction is shown as a solid arrow.
Group direction does not dictate individual agent movement rigidly. Each agent still has enough ﬂexibility to choose its
action to cooperate. For instance, suppose that bottom right cell in Fig. 5c has a high bilateral reward value. Then, B can plan
to go south twice and C can plan to halt ﬁrst and then go east. Coupled with measures in Section 3.4, group direction tends to
steer the group to move in formation A B C.
To further reduce the domains for movement decisions, agents will not attempt halt in the second movement. Action halt
is necessary for two agents to meet when they are in certain relative positions, as shown in the above example. They can still
do so with halt in the ﬁrst step.
With the combination of the above measures, domain cardinalities of mvA;1;mvC;1 and mvB;2 are reduced from 5 to 4, and
those of mvA;2 and mvC;2 are reduced from 5 to 3.
3.4. Enforcing behavior with utility
As mentioned above, within a group, we expect cooperation between A and B and between B and C, but avoidance of
direct interaction between A and C. We also expect different groups to avoid each other. These behaviors introduce indepen-Table 1
Conditional probability distribution P psx;1y jmvx;1
 
.
psx;1 mvx;1
north south east west halt
(0,0) 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.9
(1,0) 0.025 0.025 0.9 0.025 0.025
(1,0) 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.9 0.025
(0,1) 0.9 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025
(0,1) 0.025 0.9 0.025 0.025 0.025
A
B
C B
A
C
B
C
A
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5. Determine group direction based on agent positions.
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and must be enforced.
Rather than relying on additional computation for enforcement, we achieve these desirable behaviors through standard
inference computation for CDNs (see Section 2.1). To do so, we replace each reward variable rwxy;iy by a new utility variable
utxy;iy . Recall that rw
xy;i
y is a binary variable and distribution P rw
xy;i
y ¼ yjp rwxy;iy
  
associated with rwxy;iy encodes utility func-
tion u p rwxy;iy
  
, where p rwxy;iy
 
is the parent nodes of rwxy;iy and consists of position variables psx;iy or ps
y;i
y . The distribution
P utxy;iy ¼ yjp utxy;iy
  
associated with utxy;iy is obtained by modifying u p rw
xy;i
y
  
as follows.
If p rwxy;iy
 
corresponds to a group conﬁguration where either A and B are too far away (according to a distance thresh-
old), or B and C are too far away, or A and C are too close, or agent y is too close to any agent outside the group,
P utxy;iy ¼ yjp utxy;iy
  
is set to 0. Otherwise,2 Stri
the comP utxy;iy ¼ yjp utxy;iy
  
¼ u p rwxy;iy
  
:This utility-based behavior enforcement maintains desirable independence within a coherent decision-theoretic reasoning
framework. Coupled with the group direction, it tends to steer agents in a group to move in formation A B C, where
the group direction is perpendicular to the formation.
4. Modeling MAE with RMM
4.1. Payoff matrix
Grouping, as proposed above in the CDN-based solution for MAE, was not a component in the original RMM [7]. To allow a
fair comparison of the two frameworks in MAE, we apply grouping to RMM as well (otherwise, its computational cost would
be much worse). This implies that additional measures in the CDN-based solution should also be applied to ensure sound-
ness of group-based planning, e.g., reward adjustment discussed in Section 3.4.
Let the group size be g and the length of planning horizon be k. The payoff matrix for each RMM agent has a dimension g,
the width of each dimension is 5k where 5 is the number of alternative movement actions, and the total number of cells in
the matrix is 5kg . For g ¼ 3 and k ¼ 2, we have 5kg ¼ 15625. This is illustrated in Fig. 6, where the actions of agent B are shown
along the vertical axis.
Each cell is the payoff of the corresponding joint planmvwith k actions for each agent in the group G. Let the sequence of
joint actions of agents in G be mv ¼ ðmv1; . . . ;mvkÞ. Notation mv i denotes the joint action at the ith step and consists of the
ith action mvx;i of each agent x, i.e., mv i ¼ fmvx;ijx 2 Gg. Let a resultant group trajectory be t ¼ ðc1; . . . ; ckÞ, where ci is the
group conﬁguration after joint action mv i. Conﬁguration ci consists of the position of each agent, i.e., ci ¼ fpsx;ijx 2 Gg. The
payoff can be computed as the expected accumulative reward2 for the group GEARGðmvÞ ¼
X
y2G
X
t
PðtjmvÞ
Xk
j¼1
rwyðcjÞ
" #( )
;where the second summation is over all possible group trajectories, and rwyðcjÞ is the reward y receives at the group con-
ﬁguration cj.
Since the group conﬁguration ci is dependent only on the previous conﬁguration ci1 and joint action mv i, we have
PðtjmvÞ ¼Qki¼1Pðcijci1;mv iÞ, where c0 ¼ null. Furthermore, since the position of each agent x in group conﬁguration ci is
dependent only on its own action mvx;i and its own previous position psx;i1, we havePðcijci1;mv iÞ ¼
Y
x2G
Pðpsx;ijpsx;i1;mvx;iÞ:Combining the above, we haveEARGðmvÞ ¼
X
y2G
X
t
Yk
i¼1
Y
x2G
Pðpsx;ijpsx;i1;mvx;iÞ
 !

Xk
j¼1
rwyðcjÞ
" #( )
:4.2. Recursive model structure
For an agent x to use a payoff matrix to plan its actions, it needs the probability of each joint plan (minus its own actions),
determined by the likelihood of other agents taking corresponding actions. More precisely, for a joint planctly speaking, due to the reward adjustment as described in Section 3.4, the payoff should be called expected accumulative utility. To be consistent with
mon terminology, we still refer to the payoff as reward and denote by rw.
(N,N)
(N,E)
A
B
C
...
actions
EARG
Fig. 6. Payoff matrix for a RMM agent in MAE.
Fig. 7. The RMM tree in agent B. Payoff matrices are shown in a table format.
Y. Xiang, F. Hanshar / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 600–613 607mv ¼ ðmv1; . . . ;mvkÞ, where mv i ¼ fmvy;ijy 2 Gg, agent x needs to evaluate Pðmv 0Þ, where mv 0 ¼ ðmv 01; . . . ;mv 0kÞ and
mv0i ¼ fmvy;ijy 2 G&y– xg.
We identify the key issue for agent B to predict actions of agent A as whether A will move closer to B for cooperation,
which is partially determined by reward distribution in the neighborhood of A. From B’s perspective, the neighborhood of
A can be roughly divided into the area between B and A, and the area behind A. Since the reward distribution in the area
behind Amay be unobservable to B, and RMM agents do not communicate, the above probability must be computed by con-
sidering all possible cases of A’s neighborhood. We do so through recursive modeling as follows.
We characterize the unobservable area behind A by whether it contains high unilateral reward cells. If so, A is more likely
to move away from B. Otherwise, A is more likely to move towards B for the beneﬁt of a cooperation. In particular, let nbpyx be
a variable summarizing unilateral rewards in the neighborhood area of agent y that is unobservable to agent x, where
nbpyx 2 fallLow;:allLowg. If the unobservable area has at least one high reward, nbpyx ¼ :allLow. In general, for a group
of size g, each agent has g  1 unobservable neighborhood areas one for each other group member. They form 2g1 possible
cases. Each case forms a model at the second level of RMM tree, and is associated with x’s belief P nbpy1x ; . . . ;nbp
yg1
x
 
. In this
work, we used a three-level RMM tree as knowledge at deeper levels cannot be reasonably assumed, and it has been reported
[7] that deeper models produce little gain in performance. Fig. 7 shows a RMM tree with g ¼ 3 and k ¼ 2. Note that the third
level consists of no-info models, which are omitted.
Once the three-level RMM tree is setup (with EARG ﬁlled in), Pðmv 0Þ can be evaluated for each joint plan mv 0 of the other
agents. We describe the computation in the case of agent B. Let M be a model at the second level and be associated with the
probability PM nbp
A
B;nbp
C
B
 
. Each joint plan mv in M has the same probability being chosen by A and C, due to the third level
no-info model. Hence, the joint plan mv with the highest EARG value is expected to be selected by A and C, with the prob-
ability PM nbp
A
B;nbp
C
B
 
. Let mv 0 be the joint plan for A and C according to mv. It is assignedPðmv 0Þ ¼ PM nbpAB ;nbpCB
 
:
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by A and Cwill be identiﬁed, one from each model. Each such plan is assigned the probability associated with the model from
which it was derived. All other joint plans by A and C will be assigned zero probability. Using the distribution Pðmv 0Þ and the
top level model, agent B can determine the best joint plan for all agents (based on its own RMM modeling) and its corre-
sponding actions.4.3. Bayesian belief update
As agents explore, for each agent x, its belief P nbpy1x ; . . . ;nbp
yg1
x
 
needs to be updated for new neighborhood areas, based
on observations of other agents’ recent actions. Let lmvyx be the last move of agent y observed by x, where
lmvyx 2 ftowards;:towardsg and towards means that y moved closer to x. To simplify presentation, consider the case
g ¼ 3 with group members A;B and C. Then, agent B needs to evaluatePðnbpA;nbpC jlmvA; lmvCÞ; ð1Þ
where we have omitted subscript x ¼ B to aid readability.
It is difﬁcult, if not impossible, to assess (1) directly as a joint probability of unobserved areas. What can be practically
assessed is the following as it refers to only local dependencies:PðnbpAjlmvAÞ  PðnbpC jlmvCÞ: ð2Þ
In general, (1) is not equivalent to (2). We show below the assumptions needed to substitute (1) by (2).
Expression (1) can be rewritten asPðnbpAjnbpC ; lmvA; lmvCÞ  PðnbpC jlmvA; lmvCÞ: ð3Þ
If we assume that unobservable neighborhood areas of A and C are conditionally independent given their movements,
denotedIðnbpC ; flmvA; lmvCg;nbpAÞ;
the above probability can be expressed asPðnbpAjlmvA; lmvCÞ  PðnbpC jlmvA; lmvCÞ:
With the additional assumptionsIðnbpA; lmvA; lmvCÞandIðnbpC ; lmvC ; lmvAÞ;
expression (2) is obtained. Each factor in (2), say, PðnbpAjlmvAÞ, can be computed by Bayes rule asPðnbpAjlmvAÞ ¼ Pðlmv
AjnbpAÞ  PðnbpAÞ
PðlmvAÞ
;where PðnbpAÞ is from the last belief update and PðlmvAÞ is a normalizing constant. PðlmvAjnbpAÞ can be obtained by reason-
ing by case based on how rewards in the area between A and B are distributed. Let bwpAB , or simply bwp
A, be a variable sum-
marizing the reward distribution in this area, where bwpA 2 fallLow;:allLowg. It is observable by A and B. We havePðlmvAjnbpAÞ ¼
X
bwpA
PðlmvA; bwpAjnbpAÞ ¼
X
bwpA
PðlmvAjbwpA;nbpAÞ  PðbwpAjnbpAÞ;where the ﬁrst factor can be directly assessed, and the second factor can be estimated based on observed dependence be-
tween reward distributions at nearby areas.
In summary, expression (1) can only be substituted with (2) if the following assumptions hold:
1. IðnbpA; flmvA; lmvCg;nbpCÞ,
2. IðnbpA; lmvA; lmvCÞ, and
3. IðnbpC ; lmvC ; lmvAÞ.
Unfortunately, this is often not the case. For the ﬁrst assumption, when unobservable neighborhood areas of A and C over-
lap, we have nbpA ¼ nbpC and the independence no longer holds. The second and third assumptions also fail in this situation,
since lmvC is directly dependent on nbpA, and lmvA is directly dependent on nbpC . Therefore, requirement of these strong
assumptions to make (1) computable in practice appears to be a limitation of the RMM framework.
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5.1. Experimental setup
To evaluate the performance of CDN and RMM-based agent teams in MAE, we setup the MAE testbed with the following
features. The most productive level of cooperation is at 2. The radius of agent perception and communication is 10 cells.
Three types of environments of distinctive natures are simulated. In a barren environment (Fig. 8a), each high reward cluster
is less than 6 6 in size and is at least 20 cells away from any other high reward clusters. This type is useful to evaluate how
well agents can avoid wandering in a low reward neighborhood and can migrate to locations with high rewards. In a dense
environment(Fig. 8b), at least every 10 10 square of cells has a high reward cell. In a path environment (Fig. 8c), high re-
ward cells form a path and each high reward cell on the path has at least one other high reward cell within a distance of 2
cells.
We set up the CDN-based agent team with 6 agents, divided into two groups of size three. The planning horizon is two.
For each group, the three agents, A, B and C, are organized into a hyperchain A B C in the corresponding CDN. Subnets for
A and B are shown in Fig. 4. Each movement variable mvx;i has between 3 and 5 possible values, as described in Section 3.3.
Each position variable psy;1x has 5 possible values and each position variable ps
y;2
x has 13 possible values.
We set up the RMM-based agent team with the same team size, group size, and horizon. Both CDN and RMM teams use
sophisticated reasoning. To evaluate the beneﬁt from such reasoning, we also implemented two versions of simple, greedy
agents. One version (GRDU) is based on unilateral reward rwu and selects actions for agent x that maximizeXk
i¼1
rwu psx;ix
 
;where rwu psx;ix
 
is the unilateral reward at the intended position of i’th action. Another version (GRDB) considers bilateral
reward rwb as well and maximizesXk
i¼1
rwu psx;ix
 þ rwb psx;ix  :Each agent acts independently without communication. No group formation is applied as in RMM and CDN. For each version,
the team size is six.
5.2. Performance comparison
Table 2 shows experimental performance of each agent team in different environments. For barren (Fig. 8a) environment
(base value 0.1), each team executes 40 time-steps (80 actions planned) in each run. For dense (Fig. 8b) and path (Fig. 8c)
environments (base value 0.05), each team executes 20 time-steps (40 actions planned) in each run. Each team performs
30 runs in each type of environment. The table gives the mean l and standard deviation r of the accumulative team reward.
The CDN-based agent team outperforms the other teams. The difference is signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level when
two-tailed t-test is used for all three types of environments except path, where the CDN team is better than the RMM team
at the 5% signiﬁcance level. The t-test result is shown in Table 3, where the leftmost entry 99.99 on the bottom row denotes
that the CDN team performs signiﬁcantly better than the GRDU team in the path environment with a 0.0001 chance that the
contrary is the case.
The path environment is where all agents can performwell easily due to an abundance of clues. The barren environment is
where all agents would perform poorly because of the lack of opportunities. The dense environment is where sound planning
would best utilize the existing opportunities. Here the CDN team shows the most gain in performance compared with
alternatives.Fig. 8. Barren (a), dense (b), and path (c) environments. Peaks depict high rewards.
Table 2
Performance comparison of four agent teams. Highest means are shown as bold.
Barren Dense Path
l r l r l r
CDN 55.84 4.21 25.14 3.27 20.41 3.39
GRDU 48.56 0.56 12.32 0.20 12.20 0.15
GRDB 48.64 0.62 18.57 1.10 16.80 2.39
RMM 50.35 5.95 18.50 3.39 18.71 2.79
Table 3
The t-test results on whether the CDN-based team performs signiﬁcantly better than other teams.
CDN GRDU GRDB RMM
barren 99.99 99.99 99.99
dense 99.99 99.99 99.99
path 99.99 99.99 96.20
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agents do not coordinate. The CDN team also outperforms the RMM team. This can be attributed to two limitations of the
latter. Firstly, estimation of reward distributions at neighborhood areas of other agents through behavior observation and
Bayesian update is inaccurate. It hinders effective cooperation. The second limitation is due to existence of multiple optimal
joint plans. These joint plans promise the same maximal expected reward, but each agent must choose one joint plan and
commit its actions. Without communication, each agent may commit to a different joint plan such that the resultant joint
plan is sub-optimal. Note that this problem cannot be solved by social conventions within a LCF, as we will show in the next
section. CDN agents do not suffer from this problem because agent interfaces are composed of movement nodes, which
explicitly communicate and coordinate agent actions.5.3. On effectiveness of social convention
A social convention deﬁnes, for each agent, without resorting to communication, the action to take whenmultiple optimal
actions exist. We show that no such convention exists that guarantees collectively optimal actions in MAE.
Consider the scenario S in Fig. 9, where each cell is labeled with its coordinates. If it is currently occupied by an agent, A;B
or C, it is labeled with the agent name. Otherwise, it is either labeled with the unilateral reward u only, or labeled in addition
with the cooperative per-agent reward b0 > u. No agent can perceive beyond two cells.
Let the social convention be lexicographical, i.e.,gotoðv ; zÞ  gotoðw; zÞ;
whenever rewards in cells ðv; zÞ and ðw; zÞ are identical but v < w, where  reads is-preferred-over. Hence, B would prefer
gotoð2;0Þ to meet A over gotoð4;0Þ to meet C, because both actions have the same reward. A would prefer gotoð2;0Þ to meet
B and C would prefer gotoð4;0Þ to meet B, since b0 > u. Their preferred actions are indicated by solid arrows. The joint action
is optimal, though C is unable to meet B.
Next, consider the scenario S0 in Fig. 9, where the unilateral reward for cell (6,0) is slightly increased. Preferences of A
and B do not change. C still prefers gotoð4;0Þ to meet B since b0 > ðuþ b0Þ=2. The joint action is sub-optimal, as C would
be better off with gotoð6;0Þ as shown by the hollow arrow. Without communication, C has no way of knowing the re-
ward at (2,0) and predicting B’s action. Hence, social convention is incapable of coordinating agents with partial
observations.C’b ,u B uu, b’
(0,0) (3,0)(2,0) (4,0) (5,0) (6,0)(1,0)
Au C’b ,u’b ,u B
S
S’
Au
u+b’
2
Fig. 9. Two planning scenarios S and S0 according to social convention.
AB
C D E H
F
Fig. 10. A hypertree structure for a CDN-based agent group.
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JAVA implementations (without code optimization) of CDN, RMM and GRD teams (team size six) use 57, 16, and 0.8 s,
respectively, for each round of planning. Below, we consider their scalability. Since greedy agents act independently, their
efﬁciency is unaffected by the team size.
With grouping, each payoff matrix in a RMM agent has the size 5kg , where g is the group size and k is the length of horizon.
Hence, the space and time complexity of RMM planning grows exponentially with group size.
In comparison, each CDN-based agent group is organized into a hypertree. The necessity of the hypertree organization for
exact multiagent probabilistic reasoning is formally established in [2]. The hypertree, together with required agent inter-
faces, are essential components of tight coupling and ensure optimal decision making in CDN. Hypertree organization also
contributes to efﬁciency. It guarantees that the computational complexity of a CDN-based group is no worse than that of a
RMM-based group in the worst case, and is more efﬁcient when the CDN dependency structure is sparse. Fig. 10 shows a
possible hypertree organization for a group with 7 agents. The organization is suitable for environment where the most
effective level of cooperation is at 3. The degree of any agent on the hypertree determines the number of agents whose inter-
action must be modeled and critically determines planning complexity of the agent. As long as this degree is bounded, com-
plexity of computation at each group member does not increase with group size and complexity of planning only grows
linearly with group size.
6. Conclusion
This work is motivated by a better understanding of the relative merits of SVFs, LCFs and TCFs for cooperative multiagent
decision making, partly prompted by the disproportional research effort allocated among these alternatives. Our primary fo-
cus is on LCFs and TCFs. Where applicable, we considered SVFs as well.
The most obvious difference between TCFs and the non-communicative LCFs is the direct agent communication in TCFs
and its absence in those LCFs. Although communication incurs a cost, that cost has been signiﬁcantly decreased in recent
years and is continuously decreasing. Given the proliferation of distributed and wireless computing, the cost of agent com-
munication is hardly a sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for preferring a non-communicative framework, without taking into account
other tradeoffs associated with a communicative alternative.
From the organizational perspective, LCFs (both communicative and non-communicative) allow setup of multiagent orga-
nization with ease. For non-communicative LCFs, an agent only observes other agents and models them internally. No com-
munication protocols need to be established. For communicative LCFs, since the syntax and semantics of messages are
relatively loosely deﬁned, e.g., KQML, the cost of setting up a multiagent organization is lower. In comparison, cost for setting
up the organization of a TCF based multiagent system is higher, due to much more rigorously deﬁned communication inter-
faces between agents. For instance, in a CDN-based system, not every pair of agents can communicate directly (although
information does ﬂow between them indirectly). Who should communicate directly with whom is determined by a hyper-
tree condition and public variables between each pair of directly communicating agents must be speciﬁed before commu-
nication starts.
The work on DEC-POMDP-COM, e.g., [19], also belongs to communicative LCFs. While agents in [19] learn to improve their
communication in a LCF, agents in CDNs communicate perfectly (to be elaborated below). Hence, the approach of [19] is
applicable when self-improving of the multiagent system is needed while the optimality of their performance (while being
improved) is not critical. On the other hand, when optimal system preformance is required at all time, CDNs allow multi-
agent systems to be built that guarantee optimality from the moment of deployment.3
Although our focus is on cooperative multiagent systems, it should be pointed out that LCFs are also applicable to com-
petitive multiagents, as messages are not necessarily trusted and can be intentionally deceiving. On the other hand, mes-
sages in TCFs are trusted and hence TCFs are not applicable to competitive multiagents.
From the modeling perspective, RMM and LCFs are limited by the need to model agent interactions without sufﬁcient
information. This is evidenced by the need for strong and often invalid assumptions in order to update belief on possible
states of team agents (Section 4.3). This limitation also applies to communicative LCFs, e.g., [8]. Agents in non-communica-
tive LCFs coordinate by observing other agents’ actions. Since messages are speech acts, communicative LCFs are not funda-
mentally different. In contrast, CDN-based agents and TCFs in general do not suffer from this problem as agent interfaces are
required to render agent subuniverses conditionally independent.3 It is interesting that authors of [19] appear unaware of the TCF approach taken by CDNs and its precursors (dating back at least to [20]).
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hypertree organization, the computational complexity (including communication) grows linearly with the number of agents.
When the graphical models are sparse, the computation is efﬁcient. Although communication is essential for the operation,
when communication channel is noisy or temporarily breaks down, agent performance degrades gracefully as agents can
continue to work in smaller groups (see Section 8.9 in [2]). On the other hand, RMM (as originally proposed) is limited by
matrix-based representation of exponential complexity. This can be remedied partly by adopting graphical models as in im-
proved versions of RMM [21] and other LCFs such as MAID [17]. However, for RMM, even if each payoff matrix is replaced by
a graphical model, its RMM tree still has a branching factor exponential on the number of other agents to be modeled.
From the decision making perspective, RMM and LCFs are limited by having to guess about the states and decisions of
other agents based on observations. The inaccuracy in estimation can degrade agent performance through two distinct
mechanisms: Firstly through misjudgment of other agents’ states, which in turn leads to misjudgment of the optimal joint
plan. Secondly, multiple optimal joint plans can degrade agent performance due to independent choice by agents and mis-
match of actions from different optimal plans. Social conventions cannot solve this problem as we have shown through a
counterexample. On the other hand, conditional independence rendering agent interfaces in TCFs convey sufﬁcient informa-
tion on agent states and decisions, and result in improved coordination and superior performance.
In our experimental comparison, we have chosen the original RMM [7] as a non-communicative extreme of LCFs, and the
CDN as the representative from the opposite extreme of perfect communication. Communication in CDN is perfect in the
sense that since agent interfaces render their subuniverses conditionally independent, once messages over interfaces have
been communicated, any additional message is irrelevant. Some later versions of RMM, e.g., [8], are communicative. As they
lie between the two extremes, their performance are expected to be as such as well.
From the privacy perspective, an infrastructure exists within each CDN agent to differentiate variables into public and
private. Only information on public variables are communicated through agent interface. Private internal representations
and preferences are not disclosed. In comparison, in SVFs, each agent is in charge of a single variable, and it must disclose
some information about the variable in order to coordinate. Hence, all variables are public. An exception is SVFs that apply
cryptographic techniques to disguise the private information contained in messages, e.g., [22]. These techniques do require
the support of secure channels and may break down if messages are intercepted (see [22]). In CDN and TCFs, the issue is
handled by simply not sending private information at all.
In summary, the one-time organizational setup cost and ongoing communicative cost of TCFs (relative to LCFs) are repaid
by accuracy in modeling (relative to LCFs), superior performance (relative to LCFs), more efﬁcient computation (relative to
RMM) and a simple mechanism for privacy (relative to SVFs).
For the generality of our empirical comparison using two representatives, CDN and RMM, we draw attention to key fea-
tures of the two frameworks. Both are decision-theoretic. RMM is proposed as a general framework for multiagent decision
making. CDN is initially proposed in the context of industrial design. However, the applicability of CDN to MAE, an applica-
tion very different from design, is a clear indication that CDN is a general collaborative decision making framework. The gen-
erality of CDN and RMM and their common decision-theoretic foundation point to the source of difference in their
experimental evaluation, i.e., their difference in agent coupling and communication, and promise that our empirical results
are generalizable.
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